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Foreign Policy of Poland 
in the Post -Cold War Era 
Between the West and the East 
The collapse of the bipolar order at the end of the 1980s proved to be an 
event which surprised many representatives of the Western political elite. 
In the mid -1980s almost no one had expected that in just a few years the 
communist bloc in Central and Eastern Europe would dissolve. Because 
of that, these decision -makers were largely unprepared for the new geo‑
political situation, which not only brought tangible benefits for the United 
States and its allies, but also created new and rather unexpected chal‑
lenges to international security, including the rise of ethnic and religious 
conflicts, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or the 
increased risk of destabilization in Central, Southern and Eastern Europe.1 
From the perspective of Poland, the decomposition of the Warsaw 
Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) was per‑
ceived as an expected and positive effect of the political transformation 
inaugurated during the Round Table negotiations in 1989. These events 
were followed by the long -awaited dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
which also brought far -reaching advantages for Warsaw. Nevertheless, at 
the verge of the 1980s and 1990s, Poland was also facing numerous new 
challenges and threats to its sovereignty, security, territorial integrity 
and international position. For instance, it proved to be the only country 
in Europe that had changed all its neighbors between 1989 and 1993. It 
also found itself in the so -called grey zone of security, located between 
two blocks of countries: the NATO/European Communities nations and 
the emerging Commonwealth of Independent States.2 In this context, 
1 See: R. Zięba: Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego. Warszawa 1999.
2 R. Zięba: Główne kierunki polityki zagranicznej Polski po zimnej wojnie. Warszawa 2010, 
pp. 9–12.
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since 1989 the new, democratic decision -makers in Warsaw faced various 
dilemmas concerning the development of a proper model of the Polish 
foreign policy, which would respond efficiently to these challenges and 
secure crucial national interests in the post -Cold War international order.
This paper aims to provide an answer to the question how Poland 
adapted its foreign policy to the new and changing geopolitical situation 
since 1989 in order to secure its basic national interests and democratic 
transition. It also overviews its most important vectors, goals, tendencies 
and problems in the post -Cold War era. In order to achieve these goals, 
the manuscript has been divided into three parts. The first part overviews 
the external activity of Poland in the 1990s and the beginning of the 
21st century. The second part analyzes the foreign policy of Poland in the 
current, increasingly complicated international situation. Finally, the last 
chapter provides a general conclusion and presents major trends visible in 
the Polish external activity after 1989. 
In this context, it has to be stressed that this manuscript has one 
important caveat. Due to the required (and limited) size of this paper, it 
omits issues and problems which are, according to the author, less im‑
portant for the general picture of Poland’s foreign policy in the post -Cold 
War era. 
Polish Foreign Policy at the Verge  
of the 20th and the 21st Century
Poland Adapting to the Post -Cold War Environment 1989–1993
The emergence of the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki in September 
1989 opened a new chapter of the Polish foreign policy. New decision- 
makers in Warsaw, including the Foreign Affairs Minister Krzysztof 
Skubiszewski, quickly developed its new concept, which accurately as‑
sessed the complicated international situation in Poland. According to 
Skubiszewski, there were 11 major priorities and goals which should have 
been pursued at the time (1990). Among others, these included: assisting 
and contributing to the creation of the new European security system, 
developing contacts with the USSR and Germany, which were to be based 
on the rule of full recognition of Poland’s sovereignty, developing re‑
gional relationships, developing political, economic, and cultural ties with 
the Western Europe and the United States, reducing foreign debt, and 
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cooperating with international organizations (UN) in combating glob- 
al problems. This very concept was based on the assumption that Poland 
should “return to Europe” as soon as possible.3 In the subsequent years, 
the political elite widely believed that this “return” should be concluded 
by the accession to the Atlantic Alliance and the European Communities/
the European Union. As a result, the pro -Western orientation proved to be 
a cornerstone of its external activity for the next 27 years.
However, before Poland was able to concentrate on its relations with 
the NATO/EU countries, it had to face a number of significant problems 
coming from the east. One of the first and most important challenges 
was to secure the independence and territorial integrity, which was still 
limited by the existence of the old communist international organizations 
(Warsaw Pact, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), as well as by the 
presence of tens of thousands of Soviet troops on Polish soil. Thus, the new 
government introduced several solutions which were aimed to change 
this unfavorable situation. To begin with, it initiated difficult negotiations 
with Kremlin, concerning the withdrawal of the Soviet units, which were 
concluded in October 1991. As a result, the last Russian troops left Poland 
in 1993. Secondly, it cooperated closely with other Central European states 
in order to disband the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA. This problem was 
also discussed during the Polish -Soviet bilateral talks at the time. As 
a result, in June and July 1991 both organizations were finally dissolved, 
which formally freed Poland from Moscow’s influence. And thirdly, one 
of the key problems in relations with the Soviet Union concerned its 
rising internal instability. In order to address challenges resulting from 
the potential collapse of the USSR, Warsaw had introduced the so -called 
two -way policy. One the one hand, it officially maintained, as far as it 
was possible, correct political relations with the authorities of the Soviet 
Union. On the other hand, however, it was supporting pro -independence 
movements in many Soviet republics.4
When the moment of dissolution finally came in December 1991, it 
was welcomed with satisfaction in Warsaw, as it expected to take great 
advantages of this event. In the new political situation in the East, Poland 
faced, however, another serious dilemma, as it had to settle relations with 
the new neighbors, as well as with the rest of the post -Soviet states. The 
biggest concerns naturally occurred in contacts with Russia. For instance, 
Kremlin vigorously manifested its veto to the Polish membership in 
3 E. Cziomer: Nowe uwarunkowania, ramy instytucjonalne oraz założenia polityki zagra-
nicznej i bezpieczeństwa Polski po 1989 r. In: Polityka zagraniczna i bezpieczeństwa Polski po 1989 
roku. Ed. E. Cziomer. Kraków 2015, pp. 31–32.
4 See: R. Kuźniar: Droga do wolności. Polityka zagraniczna III Rzeczypospolitej. Warsza‑
wa, pp. 84–85; R. Zięba: Główne kierunki polityki…, pp. 24–27.
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NATO. At the time, Poland also prioritized relations with Ukraine, which 
was demonstrated by the fact that it was the first state in the world to rec‑
ognize Kiev’s independence. In principle, Poles wished to create a strong 
buffer zone in the East, which would separate Central Europe from the 
Federation of Russia, still perceived as a major threat. A stable and pro - 
Western Ukraine was expected to play a key role in this concept. As 
a result, Warsaw attempted to enter into a strategic cooperation with Kiev, 
which proved to be a difficult task to achieve in the long term, mostly due 
to the strong Russian -Ukrainian ties.5 
Meanwhile, the vast majority of the Polish political elite supported the 
idea of integration with the Western structures, while it hadn’t been of‑
ficially declared for a few years due to the visible reluctance among some 
of the NATO/European Communities states. Nevertheless, membership in 
these organizations was perceived, as mentioned above, as the final goal, 
which would ensure national security and proper conditions for acceler‑
ated development in the 21st century. Before that goal could be pursued, 
new decision -makers had to face three major dilemmas emerging in the 
West. To begin with, there was the unification of Germany. While Poland, 
in contrast to France and Great Britain, accepted and supported chancellor 
Helmut Kohl’s ambitions since day one, his initial reluctance in recogniz‑
ing the Polish -German border on the rivers Odra and Nysa Łużycka raised 
some doubts. This problem was, however, quickly and successfully solved 
during the “Two plus Four” negotiations, when the Polish viewpoint was 
supported by the Western powers. Effectively, it forced Germany to sign 
a border treaty on November 14, 1990. Along with the good neighborhood 
treaty concluded on June 17, 1991, it laid strong foundation for the cordial 
mutual relations, which flourished in the upcoming years both politically 
and economically.6 
The second dilemma concerned the aforementioned doubts of many 
Western countries in the validity of Polish ambitions to integrate with 
the NATO/EU. Many decision -makers, for instance in France, hesitated to 
support such an idea. They feared not only the lack of internal stability 
in the Central European grey zone, but also the high financial costs of 
accession and the possible marginalization of Russia, which could have 
a negative impact on the European security system. Such a stance was 
manifested by the NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner during his 
5 M. Stolarczyk: Rosja w polityce zagranicznej Polski w latach 1992–2015. Katowice 2016, 
pp. 151–163; J. Bugajski: Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe. London 1994; M. Lakomy: The Game 
of Ukraine: Conflict in Donbass as an Outcome of the Multilayered Rivalry. “Politeja” 2016, 45, 
pp. 292–293.
6 E. Cziomer: Główne problemy polityki zachodniej i bezpieczeństwa. In: Polityka zagranicz-
na i bezpieczeństwa Polski…, pp. 62–65.
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visit to Poland in 1990, when he stated that the option of its accession 
to the Atlantic Alliance was not considered.7 However, in time this per‑
ception started to evolve, mostly due to two reasons. On the one hand, 
Russia proved to be a less stable and credible partner than many leaders 
in the West initially believed. Moreover, there were other options on the 
table which would prevent its marginalization in the case of NATO’s 
expansion. On the other hand, Warsaw proved to be an increasingly 
solid partner due to its successful internal reforms and rational foreign 
policy. Thus, the Polish authorities officially declared their intentions to 
join the Atlantic Alliance in 1992, when the aforementioned concerns in 
the West started to decline. Subsequently, the Western powers welcomed 
Warsaw’s ambitions to be a part of the transatlantic community.8 At the 
same time, Poland also attempted to deepen contacts with the European 
Communities, which resulted in its association with the EC, signed in 
December 1991. Later on, during the Copenhagen summit in 1993, the 
European Council confirmed that the associated Central European states 
may become members of the European Union after meeting the specified 
criteria (so -called Copenhagen criteria).9 
Finally, Poland wished to develop relations with the only remaining 
superpower – the United States. Close cooperation with Washington was 
perceived in Warsaw as the only solution that could ensure Poland’s 
security in the unstable international environment. Moreover, it would 
accelerate its accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The 
American political elite was, however, initially reluctant to allow this rap‑
prochement. Nevertheless, Poland quickly gained some trust in Washing‑
ton, as it able to evacuate CIA, DIA and NSA agents from Iraq before the 
Desert Storm operation in 1990 (code -name: Operacja Samum). As a result, 
U.S. decision -makers cancelled part of Poland’s foreign debt. They also 
provided crucial assistance in creating its first special operations forces 
unit – GROM. In other words, in the following years, Polish assistance in 
the Middle East proved to be a huge step forward in the bilateral relations 
with the United States.10
 7 R. Kupiecki: Akcesja Polski do NATO – okiem historyka i uczestnika. “Bezpieczeń‑
stwo Narodowe” 2014, 1, p. 49; A. Kołodziej: Droga Polski do NATO. SLD.org. 30.12.2016. 
http://www.sld.org.pl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/Droga_Polski_do_NATO.pdf, p. 5 [access: 
30.03.2019].
 8 R. Kupiecki: Akcesja Polski do NATO…, pp. 54–61; A. Kołodziej: Droga Polski do 
NATO…
 9 R. Willa: Droga do członkostwa w Unii Europejskiej – przykład Polski. “Dialogi Poli‑
tyczne” 2007, 8, pp. 83–88.
10 M. Lasoń: Polsko -amerykańska współpraca wojskowa na przykładzie wojsk specjalnych. 
In: Stosunki Polski z mocarstwami w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku. Eds. K. Czornik, M. Lakomy, 
M. Stolarczyk. Katowice 2016, p. 93; M. Lakomy, K. Czornik: Polityczny i wojskowy wymiar 
Miron Lakomy320
To recapitulate, at the verge of the 1980s and 1990s, the foreign policy of 
Poland was dominated by two vectors of activities: Western and Eastern. 
While the first held greater importance due to its ambitions of “returning 
to Europe,” the second vector was crucial to secure short -term interests, 
such as territorial integrity, security and sovereignty. At that point other, 
extra -European areas, excluding several exceptions, i.e. the engagement 
in the Middle East before and during the Desert Storm operation, held 
relatively little importance in the external activities of Warsaw.
The Road to the West
Polish foreign policy since 1993 was concentrated mostly on reaching the 
most important goal: becoming a member of the NATO and the EU. In 
order to do so, Warsaw worked to improve its contacts with the Western 
European states, such as Germany and France. In the first case, the bilat‑
eral relations developed dynamically. Germans willingly adopted a role 
of “the Polish advocate” in the NATO/EU. There were several reasons be‑
hind this decision, but one of the most important ones concerned Berlin’s 
desire to move the borders of both organizations eastwards. Moreover, 
Germany became the most important economic partner of Poland. Rela‑
tions with the 5th French Republic lagged behind the dynamics of the 
Polish -German relationship, despite numerous bilateral treaties signed 
since 1989. This was manifested, among others, by the French reluctance 
to fully support the ambitions of Warsaw in 1997, when Paris attempted to 
influence the American intent to invite three Central European states 
to the Atlantic Alliance.11
Poland continued its efforts to expand contacts with the United States, 
both politically and militarily. This finally brought some tangible effects 
in the second part of the 1990s. Thanks to U.S. support during the summit 
in Madrid in 1997, the Atlantic Alliance invited Poland, Czech Republic 
and Hungary to negotiations on the NATO membership. As a result, 
after short talks, Poland became a part of the North Atlantic Treaty Or‑
ganization on March 12, 1999.12 This event has been widely and accurately 
perceived by the public opinion as one of the greatest achievements of the 
stosunków polsko -amerykańskich w pierwszej i drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku. In: Dylematy polityki 
zagranicznej Polski na początku XXI wieku. Eds. K. Czornik, M. Lakomy, M. Stolarczyk. Ka‑
towice 2014, pp. 417–419.
11 R. Zięba: Główne kierunki polityki…, pp. 59–63; M. Lakomy: Stosunki polsko -francuskie 
w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku. In: Stosunki Polski z mocarstwami…, pp. 177–178.
12 R. Kupiecki: Akcesja Polski do NATO… 
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Polish foreign policy in the post -Cold War era. It meant, essentially, that 
Poland finally became a formal ally of the United States and the Western 
European powers, which significantly strengthened its security and confi‑
dence, especially in the context of the unpredictable relations with Russia. 
This also put an end to the grey zone of security in Central Europe. In 
sum, the first significant step towards Europe was made.
In the meantime, Poland also attempted to accelerate the process of 
integration with the European Union. This goal, however, proved to be 
much more difficult to achieve than the membership in NATO. In 1994 
Poland officially filed for joining the organization. Subsequently, it had to 
introduce far -reaching internal reforms, which adapted its legal system 
to the EU’s requirements. As a result of these efforts, the official talks on 
membership were inaugurated in 1998. These proved to be much longer 
and more demanding than the NATO negotiations. They were completed 
in 2002.13 
The attention of Poland’s decision -makers at the time was also heavily 
focused on relations with the Eastern European states. The major goal in 
this vector included the prevention of all negative processes which could 
block Warsaw’s integration with the West. The bilateral relations with Rus‑
sia were dominated by the Kremlin’s niet concerning the membership of 
Poland in the NATO/EU. They were also regularly disrupted by other prob‑
lems, such as Russian demands concerning the creation of an exterritorial 
highway in Poland. Moreover Moscow’s investigation into the massacre of 
the Polish nationals in Katyń, committed by the Soviets in 1940, as well as 
the Kremlin’s actions in Chechnya, raised some controversies and criticism 
in Poland. In this context, the atmosphere of the Polish -Russian relations in 
the 1990s was usually cool. Meanwhile, Poland, without luck, continued its 
efforts to develop contacts with Ukraine. This was due to the fact that Kiev 
was much more interested in cooperating with Russia at the time.14 
Polish diplomacy also got increasingly active in the extra -European 
regions, such as the Eastern Asia and the Middle East. For instance, Polish 
president Aleksander Kwaśniewski visited People’s Republic of China in 
1997, but this brought little tangible benefits in the long -term. Neverthe‑
less, it has to be stressed that these regions were secondary areas of inter‑
est at best, in comparison to the European theatre.15 
13 See: A. Paterek: Polska w Unii Europejskiej. In: Polityka zagraniczna i bezpieczeństwa 
Polski…; E. Cziomer: Główne problemy polityki zachodniej i bezpieczeństwa…
14 M. Lakomy: Główne problemy w stosunkach polsko -rosyjskich na początku XXI wieku. 
In: Stosunki Polski z sąsiadami w pierwszej dekadzie XXI wieku. Ed. M. Stolarczyk. Katowice 
2011, pp. 72–73.
15 T. Okraska: Polska wobec wzrastającej potęgi Chin. Próba oceny szans i zagrożeń. In: 
Dylematy polityki zagranicznej Polski…, pp. 567–572; Historia stosunków polsko -chińskich. 
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Poland and the War on Terror at the Beginning of the 21st Century
Another phase of Poland’s foreign policy began in 2001, due the 9/11 ter‑
rorist attacks. Its decision -makers and society, being already a part of the 
transatlantic community, obviously expressed their solidarity with the 
American nation and decided to take part in the “War on Terror,” which 
was declared subsequently by George W. Bush. This decision proved to 
have long -term effects, as Warsaw increased its activity in the Middle East 
and Central Asia. 
On the one hand, since 2002, the Polish army participated in the stabil‑
ity operation in Afghanistan. Its level of military engagement in Central 
Asia peaked between 2008 and 2011, when the Polish troops took respon‑
sibility for the security of one the provinces in Afghanistan – Ghazni.16 
This operation was concluded in 2014. It has to be stressed, however, that 
Poland still participates in the Resolute Support mission, which provides 
training and assistance to the Afghan National Army. 
On the other hand, since 2002 Poland has also played a certain role 
in the international debate concerning the complicated situation in Iraq, 
which sparked some serious controversies among the NATO/EU member- 
states. Warsaw supported George W. Bush’s intentions to attack Saddam 
Hussein’s regime, which was manifested, for instance, by the signature of 
the famous “Letter of the Eight” in January 2003. Furthermore, alongside 
the United States, United Kingdom and Australia, it actually participated 
in the invasion of Iraq in March 2003.17 Subsequently, Poland became re‑
sponsible for the stabilization of central Iraq (South Central Zone), which 
forced Warsaw to increase its military involvement in the Middle East – 
Polish troops numbered about 2500 soldiers at its peak. The stability op‑
eration was concluded in 2008. It has to be noted that the Polish military 
involvement in Iraq raised some great controversies both domestically 
and internationally. For instance, the public opinion in Poland criticized 
the lack of expected political and economic benefits and high casualties 
among its troops. 
Evident pro -Americanism expressed by Warsaw in 2002 and 2003 had 
also deteriorated contacts with some Western European partners, such as 
France, which disapproved of the invasion of Iraq. Choosing the involve‑
ment in the controversial Middle Eastern operation over the European 
solidarity caused a long -term crisis in the Polish -French relations, which 
GoChina. http://www.gochina.gov.pl/index/?id=35f4a8d465e6e1edc05f3d8ab658c551 [access: 
2.04.2019].
16 M. Lakomy: Misja International Security Assistance Force w polskiej polityce bezpieczeń-
stwa na początku XXI wieku. “Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis” 2013, 11.
17 R. Zięba: Główne kierunki polityki…, pp. 154–155.
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lasted until 2007. President Jacques Chirac strongly criticized Central 
European states for their uncritical attitude towards the U.S. international 
actions. Moreover, Poland disagreed with various European initiatives, 
such as, e.g. the shape of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Eu‑
rope.18 Despite these concerns, it succeeded in becoming a member of the 
European Union on the May 1, 2004. This moment constituted the second 
great achievement of Poland’s foreign policy in the post -Cold War era, 
which completed the process of “returning to Europe.” 
After 2007, the relations between Poland and the Western European 
powers improved. The new government decided to concentrate on rela‑
tions with Germany and France. Thus, the bilateral contacts with both 
states developed dynamically. This was manifested, e.g. by the Polish- 
French declaration on the strategic partnership, concluded in 2008. Paris 
and Warsaw strengthened cooperation in many dimensions, such as the 
European affairs, military industries, energetic security and science.19 In 
addition, the Polish -German relations got more cordial and intensive, as 
both states were acting together in many affairs, mostly under the Euro‑
pean Union framework. The economic dimension of the bilateral contacts 
was also improved.20 
As a result, since 2007 Poland has resigned from the previous die-hard 
pro -Americanism for the moderate cooperation with all transatlantic part‑
ners. This rebalance was manifested by the Polish reluctance to participate 
in the NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011. This approach coincided with 
a similar attitude of Germany at the time. This does not mean, however, 
that the relations with the United States deteriorated. Both states, despite 
some controversies at the beginning of Barack Obama’s presidency,21 
developed their political and military contacts. Poland still perceived 
the United States as its most important ally and closely cooperated with 
Washington, e.g. in Afghanistan.22
18 S. Parzymies: La France et L’Europe centrale. In: Annuaire Française de Relations In-
ternationales 2009. Ed. S. Sur. Bruxelles 2009; M. Lakomy: Stosunki polsko -francuskie…, 
pp. 178–179.
19 M. Lakomy: Stosunki polsko -francuskie…, pp. 178–179.
20 E. Cziomer: Miejsce Polski w poszukiwaniu nowej roli i odpowiedzialności międzynarodo-
wej Niemiec w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku. In: Stosunki Polski z mocarstwami…, p. 145.
21 Poland has signed the agreement on creating the elements of the American anti- 
missile shield on its soil in August 2008. In this context, Barack Obama decision to mo‑
dify the anti -missile shield program in 2009 sparked some serious criticism in Poland. 
Many political elite representatives felt that they „got betrayed” by the United States. See: 
P. Turczyński: Amerykańskie koncepcje tarczy antyrakietowej w Europie. “Zeszyty Naukowe 
WSOWL” 2011, 161.
22 See: M. Lakomy, K. Czornik: Polityczny i wojskowy wymiar stosunków…
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In the first decade of the 21st century, Poland remained an active actor 
in the Eastern Europe. The relations with Russia initially improved, which 
was influenced mostly by the launch of the “War on Terror.” Neverthe‑
less, they deteriorated again soon after, which was mostly caused by the 
events in Ukraine. The pro -Western Orange Revolution, which erupted in 
2004, was strongly supported by the Polish political leaders. Its eventual 
success, manifested in Victor Yushchenko’s presidency, was perceived 
by them as a major achievement and a chance to weaken the traditional 
Ukrainian -Russian ties. These far -reaching expectations, demonstrated 
by the plans to build a strategic partnership with Kiev, proved to be 
disappointing. Among others it was caused by the internal problems of 
Ukraine, governed by the former Orange Revolution oppositionists, as 
well as by the lack of progress in bringing Ukraine closer to the Western 
structures. For instance, Warsaw failed to promote Kiev’s accession to 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 2008. As a result, when Victor 
Yushchenko was replaced by the pro -Russian Victor Yanukovych in 2010, 
Warsaw and Kiev’s relationship became less intensive.23 
Since 2004, the Polish -Russian relations suffered another period of cri‑
sis. The success of the pro -Western opposition in Kiev angered Kremlin, 
which in retaliation made a series of gestures aimed to punish Poland. 
These included the introduction of the Unity Day, which commemorates 
the expulsion of the Polish soldiers from Moscow in 1612 and the embargo 
on Polish meat in 2005. The deterioration of the bilateral relations was 
also caused by Warsaw’s criticism of the changes in the Russian political 
system introduced after the Beslan terrorist attack in 2004. The relations 
between Warsaw and Moscow plunged even more in August 2008, during 
the Caucasus war. The conflict in Southern Ossetia and Georgia caused 
a resolute reaction of the Polish authorities, which strongly criticized 
Kremlin’s military actions. President Lech Kaczyński, alongside with 
other Central European leaders, even visited Tbilisi during the war, in 
order to express his support for the Georgian cause.24 Finally, the Polish 
presidential plane crash in Smolensk in April 2010 proved to have negative 
and long -lasting consequences for the bilateral relations. This tragedy has 
sparked great controversies and heated debates. These concerned, among 
others, the fact that Moscow still has not returned the plane’s wreckage 
to Poland.
23 R. Zięba: Główne kierunki polityki…, pp. 178–183, 206–207.
24 M. Raś: Rosja jako wyzwanie dla polskiej polityki zagranicznej. In: Stosunki Polski z mo-
carstwami…, pp. 201–203; B. Molo: Nowy wymiar polityki wschodniej. In: Polityka zagraniczna 
i bezpieczeństwa Polski…, pp. 142–146.
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Polish Foreign Policy in the Second Decade  
of the 21st Century: Major Tendencies and Problems
At the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, the position of 
Poland in the system of international relations was rather solid. Due to the 
membership in NATO and the European Union, as well as a relatively sta‑
ble situation in Europe, there were very few serious threats to its national 
security. It maintained cordial relations with the majority of its European 
partners, including France, Germany, and Great Britain. Cooperation with 
the United States was also developing in most areas. At the same time, 
it gradually limited its military engagement in the extra -European areas, 
which was perceived by many commentators and experts as a positive 
move, allowing to conduct necessary military reforms. Its diplomacy, how‑
ever, remained interested in the events that occurred in the Middle East, 
North Africa (the Arab Spring) and Central Asia. It usually supported 
diplomatically the Western initiatives in these areas, but restrained from 
considerable participation in military activities, which was proved by the 
aforementioned case of the Libyan conflict.25 The only serious challenges 
continued to emerge in the East, due to the long -lasting and unresolved 
crisis in the relations with Russia.
It should be stressed that while the foreign policy was always an 
important subject of a debate between major political parties in Poland, 
there was a general consent related to its pro -Western course. Most of 
political actors were also quite keen to accept the pro -American stance 
of the subsequent governments in Warsaw. Nevertheless, since at least 
2005, due to the increasing rivalry between Law and Justice (Prawo 
i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) and the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, 
PO), Poland’s international relations have become an object of heated 
disagreements. This manifested, among others, during the aforemen‑
tioned military conflict in Georgia, as well as in the aftermath of the 
Smolensk presidential plane crash. It became even more evident during 
the second decade of the 21st century, when the traditional pro -European 
attitude of PO was contrasted with the evident pro -Americanism of PiS.26 
These contrasting visions have had a significant influence on the course 
and specificity of Poland’s external activities.
25 K. Czornik: Polska percepcja Arabskiej Wiosny oraz jej implikacji w skali regionalnej 
i globalnej. In: Dylematy polityki zagranicznej Polski…, pp. 558–562.
26 I.P. Karolewski, T. Mehlhausen: Między polityką kreowania a asertywnością. Polskie 
debaty o Europie na przykładzie europejskiego traktatu konstytucyjnego i wojny na Ukrainie. 
“Przegląd Politologiczny” 2017, 2.
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In this context, the major breakthrough in the Polish foreign policy oc‑
curred in 2013/2014, due to the eruption of the Euromaidan revolution in 
Ukraine, followed by the war in Donbass. Warsaw decided to support the 
pro -European protesters in Kiev, as their demands included association 
with the European Union and resignation of the pro -Russian president 
Victor Yanukovych. Both priorities were therefore beneficial for Poland. 
Initially, Polish Foreign Affairs Minister Radosław Sikorski, along with 
his French and German counterparts, mediated between the government 
and the opposition. After Victor Yanukovych had fled and was replaced 
by the new, pro -Western authorities, the outcome of the Euromaidan revo‑
lution was perceived in Warsaw as a major political success, similar to the 
Orange Revolution a decade earlier. In February 2014, however, the Fed‑
eration of Russia stepped in, using military forces to annex the Crimean 
Peninsula. Subsequently, pro -Russian rebels launched an uprising in 
Donbass. It was the turning point that changed the whole perception of 
the events in the Eastern Europe due to several reasons. To begin with, the 
eruption of a military conflict in the proximity of the borders of Poland 
created new, unexpected threats to its national security. For a time, many 
political elite representatives, journalists and experts were even seriously 
concerned about the possibility of the Russian invasion. This atmosphere 
of insecurity was fueled by a number of military incidents that occurred 
between NATO member -states and the Federation of Russia since 2014. 
Thus, the government in Warsaw had to respond to these new threats 
both politically and militarily. It has initiated accelerated military mod‑
ernization and increased its efforts within the NATO, aiming to secure 
its frontiers. Thus, since 2014, the Polish -Russian relations have been in 
a permanent crisis.27 
The Polish -Ukrainian relations after the Euromaidan revolution have 
naturally improved. Warsaw has supported new authorities politically, 
economically, and also militarily. For instance, it has provided humani‑
tarian aid for the troops fighting in Donbass, and has granted loans to 
Ukraine. Both states have also developed a strategic partnership, which 
was confirmed by the declaration signed in Kiev in August 2016.28 Nev‑
ertheless, these relations have encountered some serious dilemmas, con‑
cerning mostly three problems. Firstly, Kiev has introduced a historical 
policy, which is highly controversial from the Polish perspective. It has 
started to glorify Ukrainian nationalists (OUN, UPA) responsible for the 
war crimes and ethnic cleansings of Poles in Volhynia during the Second 
27 M. Lakomy: The Game of Ukraine…
28 Przyszłość Ukrainy w NATO. Deklaracja prezydentów Dudy i Poroszenki. Polskie‑
Radio.pl. 2016. http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1659080,Przyszlosc -Ukrainy -w- 
NATO -Deklaracja -prezydentow -Dudy -i -Poroszenki [access: 5.04.2019].
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World War.29 Such a tendency has put a question mark on the official 
cordiality of Kiev towards Poland. It has been also widely criticized by 
many Polish academics, experts, politicians and journalists. 
Secondly, Kiev since 2014 has been battling with various internal and 
external problems. These were manifested, among others, by the activities 
of the infamous Right Sector, which even sparked some domestic clashes 
in mid -2015.30 Such a situation has been far from the initial expectations 
of Poland, which hoped for accelerated political reforms and economic de‑
velopment in Ukraine. Due to that, the traditional goal of creating a buffer 
zone in the East has proved to be unreachable. There are also essentially no 
chances that in the foreseeable future Ukraine will become a member of the 
EU/NATO, which is a major disappointment for the authorities in Warsaw. 
Thirdly, Poland was quickly sidelined in the international negotia‑
tions over the war in Donbass. It participated in the aforementioned talks 
between the government and the opposition, which were held in February 
2014 in Kiev.31 Later on, however, Warsaw was not included in the Nor‑
mandy contact group activities, which is composed of Germany, France, 
Russia and Ukraine.32 This means that the position of Poland in the Cen‑
tral Europe since February 2014 has significantly decreased. Moreover, it 
has been a sign that the declared strategic partnership with Kiev has been 
lacking, as it did not attempt to include Warsaw in these negotiations. 
To recapitulate, the revolution and war in Ukraine has proved to be 
the greatest threat to Poland’s national security and international posi‑
tion, as well as one of the most important challenges for its foreign policy 
after 1989. The outcomes of the Euromaidan have quickly proven to be 
less positive than many politicians initially believed. Thus, many aspects 
of the Polish external activity since November 2013 have been influenced 
by the events in the East. 
In this context, Poland has remained an active participant of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization activities. In July 2016, it organized 
29 J. Tomasiewicz: Skrajna prawica nacjonalistyczna na Ukrainie: ideologie, struktury, dzia-
łalność. In: Implikacje konfliktu ukraińskiego dla polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa Polski. 
Eds. K. Czornik, M. Lakomy, M. Stolarczyk. Katowice 2015.
30 P. Andrusieczko: Bitwa o Mukaczewo, czyli bratobójcze walki na Ukrainie. W roli 
głównej Prawy Sektor. Gazeta Wyborcza. 2015. http://wyborcza.pl/1,75399,18344378,bitwa -o-
mukaczewo -czyli -bratobojcze -walki -na -ukrainie -w -roli.html?disableRedirects=true [ac‑
cess: 15.03.2019].
31 E. Stasik: Przełom na Ukrainie. Porozumienie podpisane. DW.com. 2014. http://www.
dw.com/pl/prze%C5%82om -na -ukrainie -porozumienie -podpisane/a -17449162 [access: 
1.04.2019].
32 Normandy Format Foreign Ministers Start Talks on Donbas in Minsk. KyivPost. 2016. 
https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine -politics/normandy -format -foreign -ministers -start -tal 
ks -donbas -minsk.html [access: 30.03.2019].
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the NATO summit in Warsaw, where member -states decided to introduce 
new security mechanisms aiming to secure the Alliance’s eastern flank. 
This was consistent with the Polish interests after the eruption of the 
Donbass war. Among other, the new solutions included strengthened 
NATO’s military presence in Poland. The summit communiqué has also 
strongly criticized international activities of the Federation of Russia and 
reaffirmed the Alliance’s support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and stability.33 
This meant that the conference in Warsaw was a major success of the 
Polish foreign policy.
Meanwhile, Poland has been less active within the European Union 
framework. Its interests within the EU, since the parliamentary elec- 
tions in 2015, have been focused mostly on the migrant crisis, due to two 
reasons. Firstly, it has been considered by the new decision -makers as 
a major threat to European security. Secondly, some European leaders, 
such as the German chancellor Angela Merkel, intended to introduce 
a new system of relocation and resettlement of asylum seekers among the 
EU member -states, based on obligatory quotas. The new government in 
Warsaw strongly opposed these plans, which was manifested in a number 
of statements and actions in the international environment, e.g. concluded 
in cooperation with the Visegrad Group.34 
In this context, it has to be stressed that since the elections in 2015, 
there have been some evident modifications in Poland’s foreign policy 
in the Western vector. Firstly, while the relations with Germany have 
been still recognized as a priority.35 the general atmosphere in bilateral 
relationships has deteriorated. Thus, the previously noticeable partner‑
ship in various European affairs has become less evident. Secondly, the 
Polish -French relations suffered a crisis in 2016, mostly, but not only, due 
to the October 2016 decision of the government in Warsaw to cancel the 
purchase of the French transport helicopters Caracal.36 It has caused seri‑
33 Warsaw Summit Communiqué. NATO.int. 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
official_texts_133169.htm?selectedLocale=en [access: 17.03.2019].
34 Szydło: nie będzie zgody V4 na zmianę zasad relokacji uchodźców. WP.pl. 2016. http://
wiadomosci.wp.pl/kat,1342,title,Szydlo -nie -bedzie -zgody -V4 -na -zmiane -zasad-relokacji-
 -uchodzcow,wid,18258803,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=118cea&_ticrsn=3 [access: 28.03.2019].
35 Foreign Affairs Minister Witold Waszczykowski has described Germany as the 
“most important neighbor and economic partner” of Poland (Minister Witold Waszczykow-
ski o priorytetach polskiej dyplomacji. Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych RP. 2016. https://
www.msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/minister_witold_waszczykowski_o_priory 
tetach_polskiej_dyplomacji [access: 4.01.2017]). 
36 According to official statements, this decision was caused by the insufficient 
French offset offer (Polska nie kupi Caracali. Ministerstwo Rozwoju kończy negocjacje z Airbus. 
Defence24.pl. 2016. http://www.defence24.pl/461956,polska -nie -kupi -caracali -ministerstwo- 
rozwoju -konczy -negocjacje -z -airbus [access: 20.02.2017]). 
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ous resentments among the 5th French Republic political elite and public 
opinion. Thirdly, Warsaw has added new impetus to the relations with 
Great Britain, which has been preparing to leave the EU. This new trend 
has been manifested in the first ever Polish -British intergovernmental 
consultations in London, which were held in November 2016. During the 
event, London promised Poland close political, economic and cultural ties 
after its EU exit.37
Since 2015, Poland has also manifested its commitment to the alliance 
with the United States, especially in context of the aforementioned con‑
flict in Ukraine. There are several arguments to support this statement. 
To begin with, the new authorities have stressed multiple times the 
importance of the relations with the United States, especially in terms 
of security. Secondly, Warsaw has decided to buy advanced American 
weaponry, such as the AGM -158B JASSM -ER cruise missiles, which 
should significantly improve the Polish military capabilities.38 Thirdly, 
it has cooperated with the United States in developing the elements of 
the American anti -missile defence system in Poland. The construction of 
the U.S. anti -missile platform in Redzikowo started in May 2016.39 Both 
states have also conducted numerous military exercises, such as the 
Anaconda in June 2016. And finally, due to the decisions taken during the 
NATO summit in Warsaw, American troops started relocation to Poland, 
in order to strengthen the Alliance’s eastern flank.40
Moreover, it has to be stressed that Poland has recently increased its 
political and military activities in the extra -European areas again. For 
instance, its troops participated in the European Union’s military opera‑
tions in Africa: European Union Training Mission in Mali (2013–2014) and 
37 First Ever Polish -British Intergovernmental Consultations. Premier.gov.pl. 2016. https:
//www.premier.gov.pl/en/news/news/first -ever -polish -british -intergovernmental-consul 
tations.html [access: 5.04.2019]; Britain Promises Close Ties with Poland after EU Exit. 
FoxNews. 2016. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/11/28/britain -promises -close -ties-with- 
poland -after -eu -exit.html [access: 2.04.2019].
38 J. Palowski: 70 pocisków JASSM -ER dla polskich F -16. Zgoda Departamentu Stanu. De‑
fence24.pl. 2016. http://www.defence24.pl/500502,70 -pociskow -jassm -er -dla-polskich-f -16- 
zgoda -departamentu -stanu [access: 3.04.2019]; Polska kupi od USA rakiety JASSM -ER.
Wartość kontraktu to prawie miliard złotych. wPolityce.pl. 2016. http://wpolityce.pl/polity
ka/320833 -polska -kupi -od -usa -rakiety -jassm -er -wartosc -kontraktu -to -prawie-miliard -zlo 
tych [access: 3.04.2019].
39 R. Browne: U.S. Launches Long -Awaited European Missile Defense Shield. CNN. 2016. 
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/11/politics/nato -missile -defense -romania -poland [access: 
5.04.2019].
40 Gen. Hodges: batalion USA w Polsce – w kwietniu, brygada – prawdopodobnie w lutym. 
Onet.pl. 2016. http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/kiedy -wojska -usa -pojawia -sie -w-polsce/pxc 
285 [access: 4.04.2019].
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European Union Force in Central African Republic (2014–2015). In 2016 
Warsaw decided to take part in the international fight against the so- 
called Islamic State in the Middle East.41 Moreover, the new authorities 
have also attempted to develop political and economic relations between 
Poland and the PRC, which in 2011 had gained the level of strategic 
partnership but as yet lacked the proper content. This was manifested 
in the fruitful visit to the PRC conducted by president Andrzej Duda 
in November 2015.42 As a result, president Xi Jinping visited Poland in 
June 2016. 
To recapitulate, recently the Polish foreign policy has undergone some 
significant modifications, mostly due to the eruption of the military conflict 
in Ukraine in 2014 and the change of government in 2015. Poland seeks 
to find a new modus operandi in an uncertain international environment, 
which would ensure its security and strengthen its international position. 
This was manifested, among others, in the activities of Poland within 
the NATO (summit in Warsaw), and the EU (disagreement on migrant 
relocation system), as well as strong emphasis put on relations with the 
United States. Moreover, Warsaw has been recently more interested in the 
extra -European regions as well. These tendencies have continued in 2017 
and 2018; however, there was a visible lack of long -lasting, positive effects. 
Warsaw was still conflicted with major European powers (with the excep‑
tion of Great Britain) over internal its situation, as well as over diverging 
concepts of European integration. At the same time, it was concentrated 
on cooperation with the United States, which was manifested with, 
e.g. increased arms deals. However, it has to be stressed that in time, 
a visible lack of balance in bilateral relations (in favor for Washington) 
started to be more and more visible.
Conclusions
At the turn of the 1980s, Poland faced numerous challenges concerning 
the fall of the bipolar international order. Within just a few years, it suc‑
cessfully coped with the majority of them, securing its sovereignty and 
41 W. Rylukowski: Poland to Send Up to 210 Troops to Fight Against ISIS. WBJ.pl. 2016. 
http://wbj.pl/poland -to -send -up -to -210 -troops -to -fight -against -isis/ [access: 3.04.2019].
42 Xi Jinping Holds Talks with President Andrzej Duda of Poland, Two Heads of States 
Decide to Promote Development Level of China -Poland Strategic Partnership. Ministry of For-
eign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2015. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
zxxx_662805/t1319025.shtml [access: 5.04.2019].
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territorial integrity. It settled relations with its new neighbors, partook in 
the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance, removed Russian units from its territory and laid strong 
foundations for relations with its future key partners: United States and 
Germany. 
Since then, the foreign policy of Poland has been characterized by 
several outstanding features. To begin with, it has been continuously 
concentrated on the transatlantic area, i.e. North America and Western Eu‑
rope. Until 2004, Poland had been focused on “returning to Europe,” which 
was concluded by its accession to the NATO/EU. Since then Poland has 
proved to be an active member of both organizations. It has also attempted 
to use them in order to realize its foreign policy goals and strengthen its 
international position, especially in the Eastern Europe. The western vector 
of the Polish external activity has been dominated by the relations with 
two states. First, there is the United States, which has been perceived as 
a crucial partner and ally, invaluable from the national security’s point of 
view. Therefore, Warsaw has traditionally attempted to develop bilateral 
relations with Washington, with a particular emphasis put on military 
cooperation. However, sometimes these relations raised some international 
concerns, due to Warsaw’s excessive pro -Americanism. Second, there is 
Germany, which has been crucial for the Polish economy and the member‑
ship in the European Union/NATO. After the accession, both states, despite 
some natural differences, frequently cooperated in the various European 
affairs, which was perfectly visible between 2007 and 2015.
Secondly, the Central and Eastern Europe has also played a crucial 
role, especially from the national security viewpoint. Foreign policy in 
the East has been strongly influenced by the complicated relations with 
Russia. Since day one these contacts have been unstable, permeated by 
regular crises. Polish decision -makers have perceived Kremlin’s policy of 
rebuilding its international position as a clear threat. Both states expressed 
different opinions on such issues as, e.g. the NATO expansion and the 
Chechnya wars in the 1990s, as well as the annexation of the Crimean 
Peninsula in 2014. Both states have also competed for the influence over 
Ukraine, which was evident during the Orange Revolution in 2004 or the 
Euromaidan revolution in 2013/2014. However, even since the eruption of 
the military conflict in Donbass, the Polish -Ukrainian strategic partner‑
ship, crucial for Warsaw, has been facing some challenges which need to 
be addressed. In this context, the relations with other states in Central and 
Eastern Europe have been for decades of rather secondary importance, 
despite their geographical proximity. Poland has frequently exploited the 
Visegrad Group framework and supported the Baltic states sovereignty 
and security, but it hasn’t been a major focus of its foreign policy.
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Finally, extra -European events have rarely brought increased atten‑
tion of the Polish political elite. There were, however, a few exceptions. 
To begin with, Poland increased its presence in the Middle East several 
times. This was manifested by the aforementioned Iraq invasion in 2003, 
the subsequent stability operation in this country, as well as the recent op‑
erations against the Islamic State in Kuwait and Iraq. Moreover, it was an 
active participant in the combat against the Taliban in Central Asia. Polish 
troops also participated in several peacekeeping and training operations 
in Africa (Central African Republic, Congo, Tchad), but this involvement 
was rather influenced by the logics of its relations with France and other 
European Union’s partners. When it comes to diplomatic relations with 
extra -European powers, they were usually lacking serious initiatives on 
the Polish side. The only significant exception in the recent years concerns 
the development of relations with the People’s Republic of China. 
Bibliography
Books
Bugajski J: Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe. London 1994.
Kuźniar R.: Droga do wolności. Polityka zagraniczna III Rzeczypospolitej. Warsza-
wa 2008.
Stolarczyk M.: Rosja w polityce zagranicznej Polski w latach 1992–2015. Katowi-
ce 2016.
Zięba R.: Główne kierunki polityki zagranicznej Polski po zimnej wojnie. Warsza-
wa 2010.
Zięba R.: Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego. Warszawa 1999.
Scientific Articles and Chapters in Edited Volumes
Cziomer E.: Główne problemy polityki zachodniej i bezpieczeństwa. In: Polityka za-
graniczna i bezpieczeństwa Polski po 1989 roku. Ed. E. Cziomer. Kraków 2015, 
pp. 61–81.
Cziomer E.: Miejsce Polski w poszukiwaniu nowej roli i odpowiedzialności 
międzynarodowej Niemiec w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku. In: Stosunki Polski 
z mocarstwami w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku. Eds. K. Czornik, M. Lakomy, 
M. Stolarczyk. Katowice 2016, pp. 131–157.
Cziomer E.: Nowe uwarunkowania, ramy instytucjonalne oraz założenia polityki zagran-
icznej i bezpieczeństwa Polski po 1989 r. In: Polityka zagraniczna i bezpieczeństwa 
Polski po 1989 roku. Ed. E. Cziomer. Kraków 2015, pp. 15–40.
Foreign Policy of Poland in the Post -Cold War Era… 333
Czornik K.: Polska percepcja Arabskiej Wiosny oraz jej implikacji w skali regional-
nej i globalnej. In: Dylematy polityki zagranicznej Polski na początku XXI wieku. 
Eds. K. Czornik, M. Lakomy, M. Stolarczyk. Katowice 2014, pp. 537–565.
Czornik K., Lakomy M.: Polityczny i wojskowy wymiar stosunków polsko -amerykańskich 
w pierwszej i drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku. In: Dylematy polityki zagranicznej Polski 
na początku XXI wieku. Eds. K. Czornik, M. Lakomy, M. Stolarczyk. Katowice 
2014, pp. 417–441.
Karolewski I.P., Mehlhausen T.: Między polityką kreowania a asertywnością. Polskie 
debaty o Europie na przykładzie europejskiego traktatu konstytucyjnego i wojny na 
Ukrainie. „Przegląd Politologiczny” 2017, 2, pp. 55–78. 
Kupiecki R.: Akcesja Polski do NATO – okiem historyka i uczestnika. „Bezpieczeństwo 
Narodowe” 2014, 1, pp. 41–75. 
Lakomy M.: The Game of Ukraine: Conflict in Donbass as an Outcome of the Multilay-
ered Rivalry. „Politeja” 2016, 45, pp. 279–316.
Lakomy M.: Główne problemy w stosunkach polsko -rosyjskich na początku XXI wieku. 
In: Stosunki Polski z sąsiadami w pierwszej dekadzie XXI wieku. Ed. M. Stolarc‑
zyk. Katowice 2011, pp. 69–113.
Lakomy M.: Misja International Security Assistance Force w polskiej polityce 
bezpieczeństwa na początku XXI wieku. „Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesien‑
sis” 2013, 11, pp. 231–252.
Lakomy M.: Stosunki polsko -francuskie w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku. In: Stosunki 
Polski z mocarstwami w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku. Eds. K. Czornik, M. Lakomy, 
M. Stolarczyk. Katowice 2016, pp. 174–196.
Lasoń M.: Polsko -amerykańska współpraca wojskowa na przykładzie wojsk specjalnych. 
In: Stosunki Polski z mocarstwami w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku. Eds. K. Czornik, 
M. Lakomy, M. Stolarczyk. Katowice 2016, pp. 92–113.
Molo B.: Nowy wymiar polityki wschodniej. In: Polityka zagraniczna i bezpieczeństwa 
Polski po 1989 roku. Ed. E. Cziomer. Kraków 2015, pp. 141–164.
Okraska T.: Polska wobec wzrastającej potęgi Chin. Próba oceny szans i zagrożeń. In: 
Dylematy polityki zagranicznej Polski na początku XXI wieku. Eds. K. Czornik, 
M. Lakomy, M. Stolarczyk. Katowice 2014, pp. 566–585.
Parzymies S.: La France et L’Europe centrale. In: Annuaire Française de Relations Inter-
nationales 2009. Ed. S. Sur. Bruxelles 2009, pp. 1–12.
Paterek A.: Polska w Unii Europejskiej. In: Polityka zagraniczna i bezpieczeństwa Polski 
po 1989 roku. Ed. E. Cziomer. Kraków 2015, pp. 83–110.
Raś M.: Rosja jako wyzwanie dla polskiej polityki zagranicznej. In: Stosunki Polski 
z mocarstwami w drugiej dekadzie XXI wieku. Eds. K. Czornik, M. Lakomy, 
M. Stolarczyk. Katowice 2016, pp. 197–216.
Tomasiewicz J.: Skrajna prawica nacjonalistyczna na Ukrainie: ideologie, struk-
tury, działalność. In: Implikacje konfliktu ukraińskiego dla polityki zagranicznej 
i bezpieczeństwa Polski. Eds. K. Czornik, M. Lakomy, M. Stolarczyk. Katowice 
2015, pp. 48–77.
Turczyński P.: Amerykańskie koncepcje tarczy antyrakietowej w Europie. „Zeszyty 
Naukowe WSOWL” 2011, 161, pp. 163–181.
Willa R.: Droga do członkostwa w Unii Europejskiej – przykład Polski. „Dialogi Poli‑
tyczne” 2007, 8, pp. 83–99.
Miron Lakomy334
Internet Sources
Andrusieczko P.: Bitwa o Mukaczewo, czyli bratobójcze walki na Ukrainie. W roli 
głównej Prawy Sektor. Gazeta Wyborcza. 2015. http://wyborcza.pl/1,75399,
18344378,bitwa -o -mukaczewo -czyli -bratobojcze -walki -na -ukrainie -w -roli.
html?disableRedirects=true [access: 15.03.2019].
Britain Promises Close Ties with Poland after EU Exit. FoxNews. 2016. http://www.
foxnews.com/world/2016/11/28/britain -promises -close -ties -with -poland -after - 
eu -exit.html [access: 2.04.2019].
Browne R.: U.S. Launches Long -Awaited European Missile Defense Shield. CNN. 
2016. http://edition.cnn.com/2016/05/11/politics/nato -missile -defense -romania- 
poland [access: 5.04.2019].
First Ever Polish -British Intergovernmental Consultations. Premier.gov.pl. 2016. 
https://www.premier.gov.pl/en/news/news/first -ever -polish -british -intergo 
vernmental -consultations.html [access: 5.04.2019].
Gen. Hodges: batalion USA w Polsce – w kwietniu, brygada – prawdopodobnie w lutym. 
Onet.pl. 2016. http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/swiat/kiedy -wojska -usa -pojawia -sie- 
w-polsce/pxc285 [access: 4.04.2019].
Historia stosunków polsko -chińskich. GoChina. http://www.gochina.gov.pl/index/?id
=35f4a8d465e6e1edc05f3d8ab658c551 [access: 2.04.2019].
Kołodziej A.: Droga Polski do NATO. SLD.org. 30.12.2016 http://www.sld.org.pl/
ckfinder/userfiles/files/Droga_Polski_do_NATO.pdf [access: 30.03.2019].
Minister Witold Waszczykowski o priorytetach polskiej dyplomacji. Ministerstwo Spraw 
Zagranicznych RP. 2016. https://www.msz.gov.pl/pl/aktualnosci/wiadomosci/
minister_witold_waszczykowski_o_priorytetach_polskiej_dyplomacji [access: 
4.01.2017].
Normandy Format Foreign Ministers Start Talks on Donbas in Minsk. KyivPost. 
2016. https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine -politics/normandy -format -foreign-
 -ministers -start -talks -donbas -minsk.html [access: 30.03.2019].
Palowski J.: 70 pocisków JASSM -ER dla polskich F -16. Zgoda Departamentu Stanu, 
Defence24.pl. 2016. http://www.defence24.pl/500502,70 -pociskow -jassm -er -dla - 
polskich -f -16 -zgoda -departamentu -stanu [access: 3.04.2019].
Polska kupi od USA rakiety JASSM -ER. Wartość kontraktu to prawie miliard złotych. 
wPolityce.pl. 2016. http://wpolityce.pl/polityka/320833 -polska -kupi -od -usa -rakie 
ty -jassm -er -wartosc -kontraktu -to -prawie -miliard -zlotych [access: 3.04.2019].
Polska nie kupi Caracali. Ministerstwo Rozwoju kończy negocjacje z Airbus. Defence24.pl. 
2016. http://www.defence24.pl/461956,polska -nie -kupi -caracali -ministerstwo-
 -rozwoju -konczy -negocjacje -z -airbus [access: 20.02.2017].
Przyszłość Ukrainy w NATO. Deklaracja prezydentów Dudy i Poroszenki. PolskieRadio.
pl. 2016. http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1659080,Przyszlosc -Ukrainy- 
w-NATO -Deklaracja -prezydentow -Dudy -i -Poroszenki [access: 5.04.2019].
Rylukowski W.: Poland to Send Up to 210 Troops to Fight Against ISIS. WBJ.pl. 2016. 
http://wbj.pl/poland -to -send -up -to -210 -troops -to -fight -against -isis/ [access: 
3.04.2019].
Stasik E.: Przełom na Ukrainie. Porozumienie podpisane. DW.com. 2014. http://www.
dw.com/pl/prze%C5%82om -na -ukrainie -porozumienie -podpisane/a -17449162 
[access: 1.04.2019].
Foreign Policy of Poland in the Post -Cold War Era… 335
Szydło: nie będzie zgody V4 na zmianę zasad relokacji uchodźców. WP.pl. 2016. http://wi
adomosci.wp.pl/kat,1342,title,Szydlo -nie -bedzie -zgody -V4 -na -zmiane -zasad -re 
lokacji -uchodzcow,wid,18258803,wiadomosc.html?ticaid=118cea&_ticrsn=3 
[access: 28.03.2019].
Warsaw Summit Communiqué. NATO.int. 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
official_texts_133169.htm?selectedLocale=en [access: 17.03.2019].
Xi Jinping Holds Talks with President Andrzej Duda of Poland, Two Heads of States De-
cide to Promote Development Level of China -Poland Strategic Partnership. Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. 2015. http://www.fmprc.
gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1319025.shtml [access: 5.04.2019].
Miron Lakomy
Foreign Policy of Poland in the Post-Cold War Era 
Between the West and the East
Summary: This paper aims to provide an answer to the question how Poland adapted its 
foreign policy to the new and changing geopolitical situation since 1989, in order to secure 
its basic national interests and support democratic transformation. It also overviews its 
most important vectors, goals, tendencies and problems throughout the last 27 years. 
It argues that the Polish external activity since the end of the Cold War has been largely 
focused on the events which occurred in Europe and the transatlantic area. This strictly 
regional fixation has been caused mostly by the specific geopolitical position of Poland, as 
well as by its limited resources in comparison to the Western European powers. Therefore, 
its foreign policy usually expressed limited interest in the extra-European affairs, with 
the exception of the military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan at the beginning of 
the 21st century.
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